The previous pictures were labeled as public domain, but are actually a collage of pictures under other licenses.
I now replaced them with a jpeg of simply a white pixel.
I used keyword_list[:key], but if the key doesn't exist, it will return nil. I actually expect a list and further down the code I use that list.
I believe the key should always be present, but in case it's not, it's better to return an empty list instead of nil. That way the code wont fail further down the line.
During attachment upload Pleroma returns a "description" field. Pleroma-fe has an MR to use that to pre-fill the image description field, <https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma-fe/-/merge_requests/1399>
* This MR allows Pleroma to read the EXIF data during upload and return the description to the FE
* If a description is already present (e.g. because a previous module added it), it will use that
* Otherwise it will read from the EXIF data. First it will check -ImageDescription, if that's empty, it will check -iptc:Caption-Abstract
* If no description is found, it will simply return nil, just like before
* When people set up a new instance, they will be asked if they want to read metadata and this module will be activated if so
This was taken from an MR i did on Pleroma and isn't finished yet.
Tries fully-qualifying emoji when receiving them, by adding the emoji
variation sequence to the received reaction emoji.
This issue arises when other instance software, such as Misskey, tries
reacting with emoji that have unqualified or minimally qualified
variants, like a red heart. Pleroma only accepts fully qualified emoji
in emoji reactions, and refused those emoji. Now, Pleroma will attempt
to properly qualify them first, and reject them if checks still fail.
The list of TLS versions was added by
8bd2b6eb13 when hackney version was
pinned to 1.15.2. Later hackney version was upgraded
(166455c884) but the list of TLS
versions wasn't removed. From the hackney point of view, this list has
been replaced by the OTP defaults since 0.16.0
(734694ea4e24f267864c459a2f050e943adc6694).
It looks like the same issue already occurred before:
0cb7b0ea84.
A way to test this issue (where example.com is an ActivityPub site
which uses TLSv1.3 only):
$ PLEROMA_CONFIG_PATH=/path/to/config.exs pleroma start_iex
Erlang/OTP 22 [erts-10.7.2.16] [source] [64-bit] [smp:2:2] [ds:2:2:10] [async-threads:1] [hipe]
Erlang/OTP 22 [erts-10.7.2.16] [source] [64-bit] [smp:2:2] [ds:2:2:10] [async-threads:1] [hipe]
Interactive Elixir (1.10.4) - press Ctrl+C to exit (type h() ENTER for help)
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)2> Pleroma.Object.Fetcher.fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id("https://example.com/@/Nick/")
{:error,
{:tls_alert,
{:protocol_version,
'TLS client: In state hello received SERVER ALERT: Fatal - Protocol Version\n'}}}
With this patch, the output is the expected one:
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)3> Pleroma.Object.Fetcher.fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id("https://example.com/@/Nick/")
{:error,
{:ok,
%{
"@context" => [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
"https://w3id.org/security/v1",
%{
"Emoji" => "toot:Emoji",
"Hashtag" => "as:Hashtag",
"atomUri" => "ostatus:atomUri",
"conversation" => "ostatus:conversation",
"featured" => "toot:featured",
"focalPoint" => %{"@container" => "@list", "@id" => "toot:focalPoint"},
"inReplyToAtomUri" => "ostatus:inReplyToAtomUri",
"manuallyApprovesFollowers" => "as:manuallyApprovesFollowers",
"movedTo" => "as:movedTo",
"ostatus" => "http://ostatus.org#",
"sensitive" => "as:sensitive",
"toot" => "http://joinmastodon.org/ns#"
}
],
"endpoints" => %{"sharedInbox" => "https://example.com/inbox"},
"followers" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/followers",
"following" => nil,
"icon" => %{
"type" => "Image",
"url" => "https://example.com/static/media/[...].png"
},
"id" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/",
"inbox" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/inbox",
"liked" => nil,
"name" => "Nick",
"outbox" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/outbox",
"preferredUsername" => "Nick",
"publicKey" => %{
"id" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/#main-key",
"owner" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/",
"publicKeyPem" => "[...]
},
"summary" => "",
"type" => "Person",
"url" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/"
}}
A way to test the reverse proxy bits of this issue (where example.com allows TLSv1.3 only):
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)1> Pleroma.ReverseProxy.Client.Hackney.request("GET", "https://example.com", [], [])
{:error,
{:tls_alert,
{:protocol_version,
'TLS client: In state hello received SERVER ALERT: Fatal - Protocol Version\n'}}}
* rejected_shortcodes is defined as a list of strings in the
configuration description. As such, database-based configuration was
led to handle those settings as strings, and not as the actually
expected type, Regex.
* This caused each message passing through this MRF, if a rejected
shortcode was set and the emoji did not exist already on the instance,
to fail federating, as an exception was raised, swiftly caught and
mostly silenced.
* This commit fixes the issue by introducing new behavior: strings are
now handled as perfect matches for an emoji shortcode (meaning that if
the emoji-to-be-pulled's shortcode is in the blacklist, it will be
rejected), while still supporting Regex types as before.
It retrieved two ReportNotes and then checked one of them. But the order isn't guaranteed, while the test tested on the content of the first ReportNote.
I made the test on the content more generic
Ilja
![https://example.com/static/media/[...].png](https://example.com/static/media/[...].png){kind=link}