Resolve information disclosure vulnerability through emoji pack archive download endpoint
The pack name has been sanitized so an attacker cannot upload a media file called pack.json with their own handcrafted list of emoji files as arbitrary files on the filesystem and then call the emoji pack archive download endpoint with a pack name crafted to the location of the media file they uploaded which tricks Pleroma into generating a zip file of the target files the attacker wants to download. The attack only works if the Pleroma instance does not have the AnonymizeFilename upload filter enabled, which is currently the default. Reported by: graf@poast.org
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Emoji pack loader sanitizes pack names
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@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ def update_metadata(name, data) do
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@spec load_pack(String.t()) :: {:ok, t()} | {:error, :file.posix()}
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def load_pack(name) do
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name = Path.basename(name)
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pack_file = Path.join([emoji_path(), name, "pack.json"])
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with {:ok, _} <- File.stat(pack_file),
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@ -90,4 +90,8 @@ test "add emoji file", %{pack: pack} do
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assert updated_pack.files_count == 1
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end
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test "load_pack/1 ignores path traversal in a forged pack name", %{pack: pack} do
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assert {:ok, ^pack} = Pack.load_pack("../../../../../dump_pack")
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end
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end
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